

CHAPTER 4

PEACEKEEPING

"Peacekeeping isn't a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."

*Anonymous Member,
Peacekeeping Force*

International peacekeeping efforts dominate today's conflict resolution. The US may enter into PKOs under the auspice of an international organization in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally. This chapter provides details on employing Army units for these operations. It explains how PKOs are established, controlled, planned, operated, and supported. Also, the possible mission of a peacekeeping force is discussed along with TTPs for conducting the specified and implied tasks of PKOs.

Section I.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

This section discusses the principles of control of a PKO, the legal status, use of force, US reaction to PKO missions, political considerations, and command and control. Since many PKOs are under UN control, this section mainly discusses UN issues. However, the use of US forces in PKOs in other than UN roles is also included.

4-1. ENVIRONMENT

The importance of the peacekeeping force being entirely neutral cannot be overstated. These operations usually occur after negotiations that establish a mandate for the peacekeeping force.

a. **US Participation.** Peacekeeping operations may occur in ambiguous situations, requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. These operations usually occur after diplomatic negotiations (which include the belligerents) establish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate is the peacekeeping force's authority to act. It describes the force's scope of operations to include constraints and restrictions. It identifies the participating nations and determines the size and type of force each contributes. Therefore, each peacekeeping operation is unique. US participa-

tion may involve military units or individuals acting as observers.

b. **Tasks.** A clear, restricted, and realistic mission must be given. The Secretary-General's report explains the functions of a PKO as approved by a Security Council resolution. They are determined by the nature of the operation and try—

- (1) To prevent the recurrence of fighting.
- (2) To contribute to restoring law and order, and returning to normal conditions.
- (3) To secure the withdrawal of unauthorized armed elements.
- (4) To establish a security or buffer zone between the hostile forces and to avert the parties to the dispute.
- (5) To replace the occupation of minority enclaves by the stronger side with UN protection.
- (6) To allow a UN constabulary to police those villages with mixed populations that are

located outside the buffer zone in potentially hostile territory.

(7) To effect liaison with UN military observers working alongside the force to verify arms limitation agreements in areas adjacent to the buffer zone.

c. **Duration.** Although there are exceptions, a peacekeeping force's existence is authorized for limited periods for the following reasons:

(1) The Security Council wishes to maintain a firm control for political reasons.

(2) Contributing and host countries are wary of accepting open-ended commitments.

(3) Contributing countries, and in cases where all members of the UN pay a share of the force, also wish to maintain financial control.

4-2. PRINCIPLES

Eight principles are fundamental to and form the doctrinal basis for PKOs.

a. **Consent.** The presence and degree of consent determine the success of a PKO. The disputing parties demonstrate their desire for or compliance with these operations. Nations participating in the peacekeeping force also consent to these operations for their own interests. They may limit the employment of their forces through ROE or terms of reference. Consent also applies to other interested states. They may support PKOs or at least agree to refrain from actions harmful to their success. The principle of consent also interacts with other principles.

b. **Neutrality.** Neutrality is closely linked with consent. Ideally, states contributing peacekeeping forces should be neutral in the crisis for which the force is created. However, any interested state may participate if the belligerents consent. To preserve neutrality, the peacekeeping force must maintain an atmosphere and an attitude of impartiality.

c. **Balance.** Balance refers to the geographic, political, and functional composition of the peacekeeping force. It is a function of consent. The belligerents may insist that the force include elements from mutually acceptable, geopolitically balanced countries.

d. **Single-Manager Control.** The appointment of an individual or agency to execute the policies of the parties to the agreement results in single-manager control of the operations.

Single-manager control is exercised at the interface point between the peacekeeping structure and the body that authorizes the operations and appoints the manager. For example, if the United Nations authorizes peacekeeping operations, the Secretary General is the single manager.

e. **Concurrent Action.** Concurrent action refers to all other actions taken to achieve a permanent peace while the peacekeeping force stabilizes the situation. Any activity by the peacekeeping force that facilitates agreement between the contending parties aids in this long-term objective.

f. **Unqualified Sponsor Support.** Organizations or countries contributing to a PKO should give the peacekeeping force their full support IAW the terms of the mandate that established the force. This support may be financial, logistic, or political; it relies heavily on consent and neutrality. The contributing groups should permit the peacekeeping force to operate freely within policy guidance but without unnecessary interference.

g. **Freedom of Movement.** The entire peacekeeping force and all its components should have guaranteed freedom of movement. They should move unhindered in and around buffer zones, along demarcation lines, or throughout a host nation. The principle of consent affects this freedom.

h. **Self-Defense.** The use of force in self-defense is essential to the PKOs concept. The principle of self-defense is an inherent right; it is the one principle that cannot be affected by consent. The ROE describe the circumstances and the manner in which peacekeepers may use force to resist attempts to prevent them from performing their duties. The ROE normally allow peacekeepers to use force only in self-defense. They should be clearly stated in the mandate.

4-3. ORGANIZATION

PKOs have three levels, or tiers, of organization: the political council, the military peacekeeping command, and the military area command. The peacekeeping force includes all three of these tiers.

a. **Political Council.** The political council is the highest level of the peacekeeping organization. It provides a system to negotiate and coordinate

with the leaders of the disputing parties. Through negotiation, the council encourages self-sustaining solutions that are acceptable to the disputing factions. The chief of the peacekeeping force may be a member of the political council. The political council receives the mandate for the PKO and coordinates status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with the belligerents.

b. Military Peacekeeping Command. Overall control of the peacekeeping forces exists at the military peacekeeping command level. Control and staffing at this level are normally multinational. The force commander exercises operational control of the combined forces, with command functions remaining within national channels. The military peacekeeping command may collocate with the political body established by the political council. This command rarely has the authority to negotiate political matters. However, it may have authority to maintain liaison with military or paramilitary headquarters and to mediate regional disputes and misunderstandings. Language-qualified personnel and communications equipment must be available. The missions of the command include—

- (1) Deterring violent acts by the disputants.
- (2) Protecting vital installations and critical facilities.
- (3) Informing the political council of peacekeeping force requirements—for example, operational requirements not covered in the agreements.
- (4) Collecting and providing information to the political council.
- (5) Ensuring impartiality of peacekeeping forces.

The command issues directive and instructions concerning operations and procedures to follow.

c. Military Area Command. The third operating level of peacekeeping is the military area command. This area command usually consists of forces from a single nation. It operates in a specific area of responsibility. It reports to the military peacekeeping command and receives logistic support from the command or through its own national channels. The military area command is normally composed of highly visible units with distinctive markings on all uniforms and equipment. These identifying marks increase the impact of

their presence, increase the effects of reassurance, and imply confidence. Area command forces should have extensive redundant communications to support their missions. The military area command deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations. It collects information through normal overt means such as OPs, patrols, visual sightings, aerial reconnaissance, conversations with local inhabitants, and routine reports. It collects, analyzes, and reports intelligence information to the military peacekeeping command.

4-4. LEGAL STATUS

The legal status of a peacekeeping force, its military/civilian personnel, and property are secured by a legal counsel with the host government. This is normally accomplished before the arrival of US forces.

a. The type of agreement depends on the present harmony between the states in the dispute and with the UN, or any non-UN controlling body. In Cyprus, a large measure of accord is reflected in a status of forces agreement (SOFA), which has the standing of a treaty. When close harmony cannot be reached, a memorandum of understanding or an exchange of letters may be required. An exchange of letters may be made directly between governments in the case of non-UN forces or unilaterally and parallel between the host governments and the UN. The agreement balances two fundamental factors: the independence of the UN forces versus the governmental authorities of the host government and freedom of movement. US military officers below the head of staff agency and MACOM level must refrain from entering into international agreements with one or more foreign governments.

b. The legal instrument between the UN and the host nation includes the peacekeeping force's rights, privileges, immunities, jurisdiction, and status to include the following:

- Authority over force premises.
- Display of the UN or force flag.
- Dress and uniform for the force.
- Carrying of arms.
- Freedom of movement in the area of operations.
- Peacekeeping operations.

- Identification of personnel, vehicles, ships, and aircraft.
- Marking of peacekeeping force positions and premises.
- Economic relations between the peacekeeping force and its individuals on the one hand, and the host state and its citizens on the other hand.
- Use of communications, postal service, roads, waterways, port facilities, and airfields.
- Use of public utilities (water, drainage, electricity, gas, and so on).
- Cooperation between peacekeeping force police and host nation police.
- Immunity from search and inspection of force documents.
- Provision of supplies and services from the host nation.
- Employment of local labor.
- Settlement of disputes and claims.
- Liaison.

c. The international agreement in force determines which country exercises primary jurisdiction for criminal offenses committed by military and civilian members of the peacekeeping force. The host country may share jurisdiction. However, military and civilian personnel of a peacekeeping force remain under the criminal jurisdiction of their own nations. The legal instrument should provide for the transfer of members of the force from the host government to their respective contingents for disciplinary action. The parties must have a plan for dealing with motor accidents, on or off duty. While members of a peacekeeping force enjoy much protection, even when off duty, they must respect the laws, regulations, and religion of the host nation, and must refrain from all political activity.

d. Identification markings must be established as follows:

(1) *UN Peacekeeping Forces*. All members, vehicles, and positions must be clearly marked.

(a) *Personnel*. Personnel must wear a blue helmet liner or blue beret with UN badge, blue brassard or armband, shoulder patch, blue scarf,

and identity card. If time permits, the UN issues some of the items of dress before the contingent leaves home base. UN identity cards are issued upon arrival in the area of operations. Arrangements should be made to obtain four passport photographs for each contingent before departure.

(b) *Vehicles*. All vehicles must display a UN flag and have the organization's insignia painted on it IAW the force regulations. Vehicles are usually painted white.

(c) *Patrolling Units*. Dismounted patrolling parties must carry a UN flag. Force regulations may order that it should be lit at night.

(d) *Positions*. All headquarters, military and domestic installations, observation posts, checkpoints, road blocks and positions must be visible. They are usually painted white, fly the UN flag, and have an insignia painted on the walls. If there is an air threat, the insignia should be painted on roofs. Positions should also be lit at night.

(e) *Demarcation Lines*. Lines separating forces must be clearly and suitably marked.

(2) *Non-UN Peacekeeping Forces*. These forces conform broadly to UN practice, except that they use their own colors and insignia. Previous and current non-UN peacekeeping forces have used the following:

(a) *Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Sinai*. Each contingent wore terracotta berets and used white helicopters or vehicles. Observers wore orange coveralls and hats.

(b) *Multinational Force (MNF), Beirut*. Each contingent displayed its national flag on its vehicle.

4-5. USE OF FORCE

The use of needless or illegal force weakens the credibility and acceptability of a peacekeeping force to host nations, the participants in the dispute, and within the international community. It may raise the level of violence in the region and create a situation in which peacekeeping forces become part of the local problem. The use of force must be controlled and restricted. Peacekeeping forces have no mandate to prevent violations of an agreement by the active use of force.

a. The passive use of force employs physical means that do not harm individuals, installations, or equipment. Examples are the use of vehicles to

block the passage of persons or vehicles, and the removal of unauthorized persons from peacekeeping force positions.

b. The active use of force employs means that can physically harm individuals, installations, or equipment. Examples are the use of batons, rifle butts, or weapons fire.

c. If force must be used, much depends on how well commanders and staffs have considered likely scenarios, and how well prepared they are and their troops to meet such a contingency. Planning should be guided by the following:

(1) *Firmness*. The will and ability to use force as the last resort are vital if a PKO is to survive hostile threats and the use of force.

(2) *Preliminary warning*. At an early stage of a force's deployment, the parties to the dispute should be informed if the peacekeepers need to use force and of their warning procedures. They should also be warned of the risks of escalation should either of the parties allow an incident to become uncontrolled.

(3) *Anticipation*. Intelligent anticipation based on good information often permits a timely deployment to a threatened area before the danger becomes serious. If a situation develops in which a force is likely to be employed, commanders should plan the use of the force thoroughly.

(4) *Passive force*. If the sector troops are deployed in sufficient strength and in control of the situation, the use of passive force to block movement may be adequate.

(5) *Combined action*. If the sector troops cannot contain the situation, the prompt arrival of a reserve who represents all the national contingents demonstrates collective effort and discourages further aggressive action. Speed is achieved by good planning and rehearsal as well as by anticipation.

(6) *Defensive positions*. Troops must reconnoiter positions, prepare positions for occupation, and cover them with obstacles. Positions must include shelters to protect troops from shell, mortar, and rocket fire. Their occupation must be rehearsed.

d. All troops must be briefed upon arrival in the area of operations on the following points and kept current on—

(1) The potential threat to include the various factions.

(2) Closing checkpoints to prevent entry into the buffer zone.

(3) Deployment to positions.

(4) How to act in foreseeable emergencies when force may be required.

e. The use of an active force is allowed only as a last resort in self-defense. As a guide, the following constitutes grounds for self-defense:

(1) When the safety of an individual member of the force or part of a force is in jeopardy.

(2) When one of the parties to the dispute attempts to use force to compel a withdrawal from a position occupied under orders from its commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety.

(3) When attempts are made to disarm members by force.

(4) When attempts are made to arrest or abduct peacekeeping force members, civil or military.

(5) When a violation by force against peacekeeping premises takes place.

(6) In the face of resistance to prevent, by forceful means, the peacekeeping force from discharging its duties.

f. Clear warning of the intention to use deadly force must be given (when time and circumstance permit) using the following procedure:

(1) Warn the party to halt or cease aggressive action by shouting the word "halt" in the local language.

(2) If necessary, repeat the warning and cock the weapon.

(3) Repeat the warning a third time.

(4) Fire warning shots, as long as innocent bystanders are not endangered.

(5) If the warnings are ignored and the aggression continues, open fire with single shots, using the minimum number required.

(6) Apply first aid to the casualties and evacuate them.

(7) Notify headquarters immediately by radio, collect the names of witnesses, recover the spent cartridge cases, and prepare a written report.

g. The peacekeeping force may use only the minimum amount of force to stop the threat to life or the aggressive violation. As soon as the attack or violation ceases, fire must cease. When a peacekeeping force is under attack, support weapons may be needed. The force commander may delegate author-

ity to use such weapons to the commander on the ground. If a resort to force is needed, it must be an impartial application not only applied impartially but also seen used impartially.

4-6. UNITED STATES RESPONSE

As soon as US involvement in a peacekeeping force appears likely, an advance party, including communication and logistic elements, should be prepared to move to the area of operations. However, elements will not arrive until the mandate has been approved by the Security Council, the UN Secretariat has officially requested a contingent, the US Government has approved, and appropriate coordination has been made with the designated UN or non-UN peacekeeping force commander and host nation authorities.

a. Before the mandate has been agreed to, the Secretariat normally acts as follows:

(1) Warn the force commander and arrange for the assembly of an ad hoc headquarters, probably from the UN military observers in the area.

(2) Establish communications between the area of operations and UN headquarters in New York before the force commander arrives.

(3) Establish communications and liaison between the force headquarters and the parties to the dispute.

(4) Convene a coordinating conference at UN headquarters under the chairmanship of the Office of the Under Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs to be attended by representatives of the troop-contributing states. Ideally, the contingent commanders should be present, but this may not be practical. The information the US representative must provide at this conference includes the following:

(a) Proposed organization and strength of the contingent.

(b) List of supplies and equipment that the US cannot provide.

(c) Load details for the air and sea movement of the contingent if national resources are not to be used.

(d) Location to which UN clothing and insignia should be sent.

(e) Postal address in the US, or elsewhere, to which the contingent's mail should be sent.

(f) Copy of preferred ration issue.

(g) Size and earliest possible date of arrival of the contingent reconnaissance and advance parties at the host nations' airports and seaports, assuming that the force mandate will be approved.

b. If the US provides the airlift and sea lift for its contingent, the movement control staff and technical backing will be required to supplement the host nation's resources at the nominated airports and seaports.

(1) Force commander and headquarters elements.

(2) Reconnaissance and advance parties from combat arms and logistic units movement control detachment.

(3) Establishment of a transit camp from elements of the advance parties to assemble contingents as they arrive, to match them with transportation, and to dispatch them into the area of operations.

(4) Force commander's legal, political, and administrative advisors.

(5) Balanced buildup of contingent combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units.

c. Because contingency planning for PKOs is politically unacceptable, improvisation is common when a new mission is established. Contingency planning for other operations is useful; however, standard air movement tables may need review due to restrictions on the size of units and heavy weapons. The proper mix of combat, communications, and logistic units can only be decided under the UN's present need. Movement to the area is likely to be a national responsibility. The US Air Force may be asked to provide transportation for contingents from smaller nations. Because an international force may not complete deployment for weeks or months, a contingent should be logistically self-sufficient until the force maintenance area is built up.

4-7. COORDINATION STEPS

Depending on the political situation, a PKO may be sponsored by the UN. This paragraph discusses the coordination steps the US takes when sponsored by the UN. Also discussed are reasons for US participation out of UN channels.

a. **UN Sponsored.** Peacekeeping evolved out of a need to control conflict without incurring a veto in the Security Council rather than from any provisions in the Charter. However, peacekeeping operations involve military personnel, without powers of enforcement, established by the UN or some other group of states to restore and maintain peace in an area of conflict. The coordination steps within US channels are as follows:

(1) The United States Mission at the United Nations gathers requests for support and submits those requests to the Bureau of International Organizations at the US State Department. Those requests that involve DOD support, either logistic, individual observers, or units, are coordinated through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Chairman of the JCS selects a joint staff directorate to organize support.

(2) The designated joint staff directorate forms a joint action cell. It develops written taskings and coordinates these taskings with the unified commanders in chief (CINCs), services, and other agencies.

(3) The DOD designates a CINC or service to be executive agent for the PKO. The executive agent provides administrative, personnel, operational, logistic, intelligence, and command, control, and communications support for committed US military forces. It may also assist forces of other nations when such support is in accord with diplomatic agreement.

(4) The executive agent also publishes terms of reference (TOR) to govern implementing US participation in the PKO. The executive agent develops TOR from an analysis of the mandate and the situation. The TOR may need approval by the parties to the dispute. They describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and duties of the US military units and personnel assigned to or supporting the peacekeeping force. These TOR are often far less precise than desired from a military point of view. The belligerents agree on the mandate and truce, since it is politically expedient for them to do so. They will have different and hidden agendas, and they may use a PKO to achieve advantage. They may also inter-

pret the TOR to suit their own purpose. The peacekeeping force may find itself deployed in an unclear situation. However, political reasons require the force to be there and to define the framework for operations.

(5) The CINC or services then coordinate support and inform the joint action cell of those actions. The JCS replies to ASD/ISA, which in turn notifies the US State Department. The CINC or services then implement the taskings.

(6) US military units designated to engage in a PKO are usually placed under the OPCON of the commander of the peacekeeping force upon entering his area of responsibility. OPCON of such US military units is retained by the unified command commander as recommended by the executive agent and approved by the JCS. Commanders of the US military units under the OPCON of the peacekeeping force commander retain command of their subordinate or attached elements.

b. **Non-UN Sponsored.** The US may engage in PKOs outside the UN with regional organizations or unilaterally. PKOs depend on the consent of the parties to the dispute, the host nation, and also on the agreement of other powers who perceive that their interests may be affected. Thus, the UN is not always an acceptable or practicable sponsor of PKOs. The appropriate political authorities decide to conduct these operations. Within the US State Department, the appropriate regional bureau coordinates desired support with ASD/ISA. The procedures used within DOD and JCS to develop specific tasks and to coordinate actions with the services would be the same as those of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission. Reasons for the US to engage in a PKO outside the UN are as follows:

(1) Lack of agreement in the UN Security Council could lead to one of the five permanent members to veto establishing the operation. Any one of the five permanent members may block action with a veto to protect its interests. After the Camp David Agreement and the White House Treaty sealed the peace between Israel and Egypt, other Arab states persuaded the Soviet Union to threaten a veto of any UN role in enforcing the Treaty when UN Emergency Force II's mandate expired in July 1979. On the initiative of the US,

and with support of the British and French, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was formed after Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982. It replaced UNEF II with an organization outside the aegis of the UN. The multinational organization has succeeded largely because Israel and Egypt wanted peace; it was in the West's interests to preserve it.

(2) The attitude of Third World states toward a UN peacekeeping force would favor another international organization to sponsor the effort. While the emergent nations often find a UN peacekeeping force a useful means of controlling a dangerous local dispute, they also are cautious. Some African nations thought the UN operation in the Congo to be a thinly disguised western interference. They have favored the Organization of African Unity as a sponsor for peacekeeping.

(3) The UN charter recognizes the right of regional organizations to deal with such matters that maintain international peace and security. These arrangements or agencies and their activities must be consistent with the intentions and doctrine of the UN.

(4) To be successful, a PKO outside the UN must have—

(a) The support of a superpower, regional organization, or multinational group.

(b) A properly constituted political organization through which policy directives, finance, and administrative matters can be coordinated and channeled to the force commander. This may be a regional organization or a director-general such as the MFOs in Rome. A committee of ambassadors obtaining separate instructions from their own governments may be needed in an emergency to launch an operation. However, it should be replaced by an organization tailored to the need as soon as possible.

(c) A designated military commander with an integrated headquarters. This can be a joint task force provided by a CINC.

(d) The consent of the parties to the dispute and of the host countries. It would be best to have wide international support or acceptance to avoid costly interference.

(e) Adequate guaranteed financial support.

4-8. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Effective command, control, and communication must be established in PKOs. The relation under UN control versus non-UN sponsored operations is different. However, both must be effective and understand the nature of PKO. This paragraph discusses the command relationships and special concerns in understanding PKOs.

a. The following command relationships are established:

(1) The most effective command relationship is one which has one commander and one force headquarters responsible for PKOs. National contingents report directly to the force commander. However, the US force commander supervises and coordinates completing his mission, communicating changes in the mission, and responding to committed units' needs. The best method is to let the unified commander, in whose area of responsibility the operation is to take place, plan and organize the operation, and provide the needed command and control.

(2) A contingent comprises a nation's entire contribution, units, and its staff officers on the force headquarters. On operational and logistic matters, the force commander has full command authority with the exception of assignments and discipline. The force commander is responsible for the good order and discipline of the force. He can perform investigations, conduct inquiries, and call for information, reports, and consultations. The national contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents IAW their national codes of military law. A major disciplinary breach could occur that brings a contingent into disrepute and detracts from its use as a peacekeeper. Therefore, the force commander discusses the case with the contingent commander. The force commander may refer the matter, through the Secretary-General, to the troop-contributing government concerned.

(3) The force commander and his staff deal directly with unit commanders. Contingent commanders are not always unit commanders. When they are not, they act in an advisory role and are not part of the operational chain of command. When large peacekeeping forces are spread over a

wide area, a brigade or joint task force headquarters may be needed.

b. Non-UN sponsored operations may be set up in a number of ways. The choice largely depends on the time available and political factors, such as the attitude of the superpowers and the willingness or ability of the parties to agree. Operations may be set up as follows:

(1) A single headquarters set up for coordinating both political and military activities. This may be a joint task force set up by a CINC.

(2) A headquarters to control military operations with political aim, coming from a separate political source.

(3) An ad hoc arrangement.

c. The force commander's directive makes it clear if anyone other than himself (deputy force commander or the chief of staff) is empowered to give orders to contingents and when. A unit commander must be assured that orders have the authority of the force commander and, through him, the sanction of the Secretary-General. As a result, a unit commander cannot accept orders from other sources, whether they come from the host nation, parties to the dispute, or from his own government. The only exception may occur in a non-UN force when national contingents are placed directly under their own governments or their ambassadors to the host nation.

d. Commanders of peacekeeping forces must understand the nature of PKOs and their effects on the members of the command. Some concerns include:

(1) Avoid escalating the rank of negotiation. This is a task for lieutenants and NCOs.

(2) Avoid spoiling troops with supplies not available to the other contingents as this could cause problems. Accept what the UN provides.

(3) If fighting starts, shift emphasis to humanitarian duties.

(4) Be careful in the selection of personnel for the force; not everyone is suited to peacekeeping duty.

(5) Immediately remove personnel who become too familiar with one of the parties to the dispute. Maintain contact equally between both sides.

e. Coordination is achieved by a system of conferences chaired by the force commander or his chief of staff. The conferences are not held by every peacekeeping force that exists. However, each has a way to disseminate information and policy.

f. Liaison between the peacekeeping force, the host nation, and the parties to a dispute is vital at all levels—from force headquarters down to company and even platoon. At force headquarters, there may be a formal liaison system. Such a system exists in the MFO, Sinai, where problems are discussed and violation reports are passed to the Egyptian and Israeli governments through their liaison systems.

g. PKOs have three levels of organizations:

(1) The political council is the highest level. It provides for negotiation and coordination with leaders of the disputing parties. The commander of the peacekeeping force may be a member.

(2) Military peacekeeping command has overall control of the peacekeeping forces. Control and staffing at this level is normally multinational. The force commander exercises OPCON of the combined forces, with command functions remaining within national channels.

(3) Military area command usually consists of forces from a single nation. It collects information through overt means such as OP, patrolling, visual sighting, aerial reconnaissance, conversations with local inhabitants, and reports. It collects, analyzes, and reports intelligence information to the military peacekeeping command.

Section II.

MISSIONS OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Brigade-size units and below conduct most US peacekeeping operations. At times, personnel will conduct PKO as observers. The types of units that could be involved include headquarters units, combat arms, CS, and CSS. The basic force structure and augmentation are situation-dependent. The peacekeeping force can be assigned a variety of missions. This section discusses the types of PKOs and the inherent tasks that must be performed to accomplish missions.

4-9. TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PKOs support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Each PKO is unique. However, PKOs may be either of the following or a combination thereof:

- Withdrawal and disengagement.
- Cease fire.
- Prisoner-of-war exchange.
- Arms control.
- Demilitarization and demobilization.

4-10. PEACEKEEPING TASKS

Accomplishment of the types of PKOs includes obscure situations. The peacekeeping force may have to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming involved. US involvement may include military units or personnel with specific tasks that must be performed in a changing environment.

a. Tasks normally assigned to a peacekeeping force can be listed under the following:

- (1) Separate the opposing sides and at the same time establish a buffer zone.
- (2) Supervise a truce or cease-fire agreement.
- (3) Prevent an armed conflict between nations or within a nation.
- (4) Contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and a return to normal conditions.

b. To accomplish the tasks as outlined above, commanders establish and deploy military peacekeeping units and observer groups in a demilitarized zone or a buffer zone between the opposing forces. This would enable a force—

- (1) To exercise control and surveillance of an area or boundary and demarcation line between the opposing parties.
- (2) To prevent infiltration or a confrontation between the opposing forces.

(3) To complete the separation of the opposing sides so as to establish a buffer zone.

(4) To direct local negotiations between the parties concerned.

(5) To clear mines in the buffer zone, since the peacekeeping force requires freedom of movement.

c. The task may also involve a survey of the opposing forces' military and paramilitary units to ensure—

(1) Permitted units are not increased above the strength stated by the parties involved.

(2) Existing fortifications are not reinforced or enlarged.

(3) There is no increase of arms and supplies apart from those agreed upon.

(4) The armistice demarcation line (ADL) or the buffer zone are not overflown by aircraft from the opposing sides.

d. The methods used to accomplish a mission may include the following:

- Observing.
- Patrolling.
- Traffic controlling.
- Surveying of sensitive areas.
- Preventing or dispersing prohibited demonstrations.
- Checking on transportation of goods.
- Searching for missing persons.
- Negotiating with local authorities.
- Providing logistic support to isolated ethnic groups.
- Gathering information.
- Clearing mines.
- Marking forward limits of military forces.
- Receiving the remains of KIAs.

Section III.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

During all phases, the peacekeeper constantly demonstrates to the concerned parties that he is following the terms of agreement. Complaints by a belligerent party against a member of the peacekeeping force undermines the credibility of the mission. Also, it weakens the peacekeeping force's position. The control of violence in a PKO requires a combination of techniques. Some TTPs of executing the specified and implied tasks of a PKO are discussed in this section.

4-11. OBSERVATION

Observation is a technique common to all PKOs. It is the peacekeeper's main duty and requirement. The observer observes and reports what he is told to monitor within his area of observation. He provides timely and accurate reports on any suspicious occurrence.

a. Observation requires understanding both the facts and their implications. The observer should pass information to the next higher echelon without delay. Successful peacekeeping depends on impartial, factual reporting along with all pertinent data (maps, field sketches, diagrams, photographs) and references to specific agreements or instructions. The observer can gather such information by—

(1) Deploying observation posts in the confrontation areas.

(2) Deploying subunits in sensitive areas and potential trouble spots.

(3) Manning checkpoints on both major and minor access roads, and in towns and villages.

(4) Patrolling to include aerial reconnaissance.

(5) Conducting fact-finding exercises, inspections, and investigations.

(6) Using video cameras and cassette recorders, if permitted.

(7) Using aerial photography.

(8) Monitoring radio transmissions of belligerent forces.

(9) Employing acoustic, seismic, and magnetic sensors.

b. Military observers must be impartial and objective. They should avoid action that might give rise to doubts about their ability to remain so. For this reason, a military observer should have neither family ties nor other close ties with persons or organizations in the countries in the mission area.

c. When no observer group is under the OP-CON of a peacekeeping force, the force must meet all its observation needs. These include both watching and reporting on the activities of the parties to the dispute in the buffer zone, the area of separation, or the area of operations. Force OPs are manned by a squad or less under the command of a junior NCO.

d. Observers must be discrete concerning all matters of official business. They must not inform anyone of information known to them due to their position. They must not use such information for personal advantage. Observers are usually not authorized to carry arms at any time.

e. In UN operations, observer missions are established separately from peacekeeping forces. However, when they operate in the same area, they function closely together. Observer missions are unarmed; OPs are manned only by officers. The force administration in the field is provided by the force under whom they are OP-CON. A general officer, who is called the Chief of Staff, supervises the organization as a whole, including the command of observer groups not deployed under the OP-CON of peacekeeping forces. Officers manning each OP are never of the same nationality. The military observer provides observation over an area of operations that requires UN surveillance. He also inspects regularly areas of limitation of forces and armaments. He ensures that the agreed troop strengths and the numbers and categories of weapons are not exceeded. He may also be given broad discretion in negotiating low-level problems between the opposing parties.

f. The following are the types of observation posts:

(1) The location and type of each OP are authorized by the peacekeeping force commander

or by the chief of staff of an observer mission when the latter is operating on his own. Changes in status must also be authorized.

(2) OPs manned on a 24-hour basis are known as permanent OPs or observation points. Except when observer mission posts are located away from a force, they should be close to support and protection. Such posts have radio and landline installed permanently. They must be clearly marked with the force flag and insignia painted on the walls and roof. A permanent post is abandoned only with the force commander's authority or when the battalion sector commander considers the lives of the observers to be in jeopardy.

(3) A post is temporary when observers may be sent to provide coverage by day or night to meet some special need. It should have a telephone landline established. Radios and telephones are installed only when the post is manned. Temporary OPs are marked the same as permanent posts and should be protected by ready force positions.

(4) Former permanent and temporary OPs are those that are no longer required for the purpose established. However, they are retained either to maintain a peacekeeping presence or to meet an unforeseen contingency. The telephone line is removed. Therefore, if a reoccupation occurs, the party must rely on radio. The post is marked with the force's insignia, and the force flies its flag to maintain a presence.

(5) All OPs (permanent, temporary, or unmanned) are given a serial number or name. If the post is abandoned, the number or name is not used again to avoid confusion. If posts are numbered, the designation identifies the type, sector of location, and serial number. Observer mission posts are given names to distinguish them from neighboring peacekeeping force OPs.

g. The following are the duties in an observation post:

(1) In a peacekeeping force, a squad normally mans an OP. This provides enough manpower for observation, rest, recreation, and defense.

(2) OPs observe, verify, and report—

(a) Movements of the military forces of both sides. Should this involve unit identifications and other information of a sensitive nature, the OP commander records the time of the sighting. He

sends the report by secure means—vehicle or helicopter.

(b) Shooting, hostile acts, or threats made against the peacekeeping force or civilians.

(c) Improvements to the defensive positions of the two parties.

(d) Overflight by service or civil aircraft when air movement in the buffer zone or area of separation has been restricted.

(e) Violations of the armistice agreement until the cause of the violation has been removed or rectified.

(f) All events recorded in the logs at the OP and its controlling headquarters. The log provides the evidence for protests and reports.

h. When assuming watch duty in an OP, all personnel are—

(1) To obtain a thorough briefing from the soldier on watch on all recent activities.

(2) To read the OP logbook.

(3) To ensure that all items on the OP equipment checklist are accounted for and in working order.

(4) To conduct a radio and telephone line check before the watch is replaced.

(5) To count live ammunition carefully; the new observer should see each round. This check may provide vital evidence if a shooting incident occurs.

i. Force headquarters provides guidance on the extent to which OPs are to send a patrolling unit to investigate incidents or to move to an alternate position for a better view. The policy for the dispatch and control of patrolling parties sent from OPs to investigate incidents may be included in force SOPs. However, the commander may decide to retain patrols at the OP.

4-12. PATROLLING

Patrolling is a key factor in most PKOs. If it is well planned and executed, patrolling can achieve important tactical advantages for the peacekeeper. To be effective, patrolling parties need freedom of movement and observation. Restrictions on patrolling must be clarified when peacekeeping force agreements are drafted. Patrolling parties, either foot, ground vehicle, air, or naval, have a combination of four tasks: information gathering,

investigating, supervising, and publicizing a presence.

a. Patrolling can be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur. When limited visibility hinders identification, the two opposing sides may be nervous and apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the peacekeeping mandate may require the commander to employ patrols in these conditions. The procedures and ground rules under which patrolling parties operate must be clearly defined and known by all, including the opposing armed forces.

b. Patrolling parties are organized to supplement the information provided by OPs in a buffer zone or area of separation. In large areas of operation, routine patrolling may be needed to ensure that breaches of the agreement are discovered and rectified before they acquire a legitimate status by default. Supervisory patrolling parties ensure that action agreed upon among parties to a dispute is enforced and completed.

c. Patrolling parties are dispatched for a closer look at activity detected by an OP. Such activity may infringe on an armistice agreement.

d. Patrolling parties that are designed to separate the parties in an actual or potential confrontation are called *interposition patrols*. They are sometimes called *standing patrolling parties*. Such units cease to operate when the situation returns to normal.

e. Escort patrolling parties protect farmers and others on their way to and from work where the route passes dangerously close to a hostile party.

f. The mere presence of a peacekeeping patrolling unit, or the likelihood that one may appear at any moment, deters potential breakers of an armistice agreement. The presence of peacekeeping troops in a tense situation has a reassuring and calming effect in troubled areas.

g. Peacekeeping patrolling parties should enjoy complete freedom of movement. In practice, the contending parties sometimes impose restrictions that are written into the status of forces agreement and must be closely observed. Such caveats are concerned with threats to the security of one of the signatories.

h. Patrolling parties can be on foot, mounted in vehicles, or performed by light aircraft or heli-

copters. Patrolling must be overt and should be by day. A unit must be easily recognizable. Its members must wear distinct items to indicate they are members of the peacekeeping force. Vehicles must be painted in the colors of the force and prominently show their insignias. The peacekeeping flag must be carried by a foot patrolling unit and displayed by all vehicles in a mounted patrolling unit. If operating at night is required, a unit must use lights, carry an illuminated peacekeeping flag, and move openly. Failure to do so can arouse suspicion, lead to misunderstandings, and risk a shooting incident.

i. Patrolling responsibilities are as follows:

(1) Check the methods of identification agreed to and used by both parties, and any police working with the peacekeeping force. Ensure patrolling unit members are carrying personal and force identity documents.

(2) Check any restrictions imposed by the status of forces agreement or other negotiations.

(3) Notify neighboring peacekeeping force units and OPs of the patrol plan. Check the need to notify the parties in the agreement.

(4) Mark all maps carried during a patrol. Memorize positions. Include a member of the patrolling unit who knows the area well.

(5) Ensure that orders are understood, regarding procedures for dealing with intruders into the buffer zone.

(6) Log all observations and events. Memorize details for sketch maps. Do not make a map of a patrol if there is any chance of being stopped by one of the parties to the dispute.

(7) Maintain radio contact with the patrolling base and report progress.

(8) Record any violation of agreements, changes in deployment, or variations in civilian activity or attitudes.

(9) Do not alter the planned route without reference to a higher authority.

(10) Ensure actions on challenge by the contending parties halt, establish identity, and report the incident over the radio.

(11) Do not surrender weapons, maps, logs, or radio without the permission of higher authority.

(12) Be alert but avoid any display of aggression. If the forces or the population on either side wave, return the greeting.

(13) Be impartial.

(14) Immediately report or confirm any important observations to the debriefing officer.

(15) Mark maps or draw field sketches immediately upon return. Marked maps and logs provide the basis for the investigation of incidents and the lodgement of protests.

j. Members of a peacekeeping force performing operational tasks carry assigned weapons for the following:

(1) When manning OPs, checkpoints, liaison posts, defensive positions, and standing patrolling parties.

(2) When part of patrolling parties, mounted or on foot.

(3) During escort duties.

(4) As vehicle guards and convoy escorts.

(5) When charged with the safe custody of peacekeeping force property, supplies, cash, or documents.

(6) During inspection and liaison visits to the parties to the dispute.

k. Peacekeeping forces do not normally carry arms—

(1) When performing nonoperational duties such as staff officers and clerks.

(2) When civilian police are attached to a peacekeeping force.

(3) When peacekeeping troops are outside the buffer zone, area of separation, or area of operations.

(4) When off duty.

l. Each peacekeeping force sets the amount of ammunition to be carried by each soldier on vehicles and to be maintained on OPs and in positions. It also sets the amount to be held in reserve in accordance with the perceived threat.

4-13. TRAFFIC CONTROL

At checkpoints leading into a buffer zone, the peacekeeping force on duty observes civilians passing through. It watches for obvious attempts to smuggle arms, ammunition, and explosives. Normally, civilian traffic is stopped and searched only on order of the force commander. Regulations vary from force to force, but normally only an intruder or law breaker is searched.

a. In some PKOs, troops are not allowed to confiscate weapons and ammunition, only to turn the carrier back.

b. In some PKOs, peacekeeping vehicles and personnel are searched on entry and exit from the buffer zone. This convinces the host country that the force is observing the laws and discovers or deters criminal activity among its members.

4-14. SURVEILLANCE AND SUPERVISION

Surveillance and supervision are operation-specific techniques. They ensure implementation of agreements. Surveillance is the conduct of observation and is used to conduct observer missions. Supervision is the act of observing the compliance to the dispute with agreement by the parties. Surveillance and supervision require restraint, tact, and patience.

a. An observer mission is concerned with monitoring the following:

(1) Cease-fire and armistice agreements.

(2) The establishment and supervision of buffer and demilitarized zones.

(3) The supervision of armament control agreements when this is not the responsibility of an observer group.

(4) Military deployment limitations.

(5) Military withdrawals and disengagements, and the return of territory.

(6) Border infiltration and arms smuggling.

(7) Prisoner of war exchanges.

(8) Freedom of movement agreements for civilian farmers working in restricted zones.

(9) Refugee camps.

(10) Plebiscites and elections.

b. The following are aids to surveillance:

(1) During daylight, the entire line or zone should be observed.

(2) By night, the area should be surveyed as far as possible by NODs and radar. Sensitive areas may be covered by electronic and acoustic devices.

(3) When the presence of an intruder is detected, illumination confirms the sighting and warns the intruder that he has been spotted. This has a deterrent effect. Searchlight beams should not be directed across the buffer zone boundaries to illuminate the parties' cease-fire lines. Searchlights fitted with dispersion screens can floodlight areas up to 100 meters. This avoids risking an

infringement of the agreement near the edge of the buffer zone.

4-15. PROHIBITED DEMONSTRATIONS

Political rallies may be held at a peacekeeping check point. The host nation's police are responsible for controlling these demonstrations. Sector commanders and force headquarters monitor plans for rallies in case the local police cannot prevent a crowd of demonstrators from entering the buffer zone. If police efforts fail, peacekeeping troops may be committed to disperse the crowd. Only minimum force should be used.

a. Whether a large number of troops are used in an unarmed role supported by armed troops or whether arms are used depends on the situation. The force commander must decide.

b. Most rallies are well publicized. Enough time is given to activate the force reserves and to move them to a nearby assembly area.

c. The local commander sets up stop lines along with wire and obstacles, which are used if the host nation's police lose control of the situation.

4-16. NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

Negotiation and mediation are diplomatic activities. They are the concern of governments and experienced diplomats. They demand a political rather than a military approach. In peacekeeping, however, situations arise that require military personnel to negotiate, mediate, and perhaps arbitrate disputes. These involve minor points of contention between the belligerents or disagreements as to the daily routines of the peacekeeping force. The success of the effort depends on the peacekeeper's personality, power of reasoning, persuasiveness, common sense, tact, and patience. Of these, tact and patience are the most important. The new role of peacekeeper can be exhausting and frustrating.

a. Once the peacekeeper gains the confidence of the parties involved, he may act as a mediator. His good offices can then effect solutions.

b. The peacekeeper can prevent major issues from arising. Therefore, the purpose of the peacekeeping mission is served.

c. Peacekeeping force personnel must remain aware of their limitations. They must not hesitate to refer problems to the peacekeeping command when beyond their ability to resolve.

d. The peacekeeper's reputation for being objective and a having good relationship with all parties in the dispute are basics to his success as a negotiator.

4-17. HANDOVER OF PRISONERS OF WAR

The handover of PWs must be carefully coordinated and well organized to prevent confusion and delay. The peacekeeping force must avoid accommodating the overnight housing and feeding of several hundred PWs. The force chooses a narrow section of the buffer zone so that PWs can be transferred on foot. The peacekeeping force should—

a. Contact the intermediary to verify the number of prisoners. Ascertain if there are any sick or wounded prisoners who need an ambulance for transport.

b. Inform the force battalion commander of the number of escorts, ambulances, and vehicles required.

c. Ensure that the receiving party has the needed transportation marshalled just outside the buffer zone near the agreed checkpoint. The receiving party authority will be allowed inside the buffer zone to the handover point.

d. Secure the area with armed peacekeeping soldiers at a safe distance.

e. Close the checkpoints and roads to all unauthorized traffic and visitors.

f. Together with the intermediary, meet the PWs at the arrival checkpoint and divide them into groups of ten. Separate those requiring an ambulance or transport. Obtain the roster of PWs and sign a receipt for them.

g. Escort the marching PWs in groups of ten with unarmed peacekeeping soldiers across the buffer zone to the receiving party at the agreed handover point. Unarmed escorts accompany the ambulances and vehicles carrying the PWs who are not able to walk.

h. Hand over the PWs to the receiving party in the presence of the intermediary along with a copy of the roster. Obtain a receipt.

4-18. RECEIPT OF REMAINS

The recovery of remains is often a part of any disengagement mission. Soldiers should appreciate the delicate nature of the operation and respect relevant religious customs and rites. Searches for remains require careful planning and discussion with all parties. The handover should occur quickly and efficiently. If PWs are due to be handed over in the same operation, KIAs should be transferred first. This avoids emotional scenes and possible demonstrations. The peacekeeping force ensures—

- a. The receiving party has a suitable vehicle.
- b. That checkpoints on either side of the buffer zone, where bodies are to be handed over, are clear of vehicles and visitors not involved with the handover.
- c. A pall bearing party is available.
- d. Along with an intermediary, the vehicle bringing the remains is met at the checkpoint.
- e. When the intermediary has signed a receipt for the remains and completed any other documentation, the pall bearers transfer them to a force vehicle.
- f. The force vehicle, accompanied by the supervisory staff and the intermediary, drives across the buffer zone and past the checkpoint to the waiting vehicle of the receiving party.
- g. The pall bearers transfer the remains to the receiving party's vehicle, and the intermediary obtains a receipt.
- h. The transfer is recorded on the logs at each checkpoint, along with the names of the supervising officer and intermediary.

4-19. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The attitude of host governments varies from helpful cooperation to forbidding a peacekeeping force from providing aid to its citizens. However, a force within a buffer zone is justified in providing humanitarian assistance to individuals within the AOR. A special humanitarian staff can be established whose areas of concentration can include the following:

- Investigation of missing persons.
- Emergency medical treatment (for life-threatening illnesses or injuries).
- Resupply of minority communities separated by a buffer zone.

Transfer of minority populations.
Repatriation of prisoners of war.
Repatriation of human remains.
Return of property.

4-20. INFORMATION GATHERING

Belligerent parties may view information gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust that parties should have in the peacekeeping force. However, parties could pursue their diverse aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping force. They may even try to deceive.

a. Circumstances can place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious problem. But whatever the circumstances, the peacekeeper needs information. If the peacekeeper cannot use the full range of his national intelligence resources, he must have their products.

b. Each item of operational information becomes vital. The members of a peacekeeping force must be information-conscious at all times. The peacekeeper must be constantly alert to what occurs around him and to any change in behavior, attitude, and activities of the military and civilians.

4-21. MINEFIELD CLEARING

Minefield clearing becomes a priority for peacekeeping forces after the belligerents withdraw. Engineer requirements must be considered in the peacekeeping force structure. Soldiers serving with peacekeeping forces should understand the techniques involved in clearing minefields and handling mine clearing and detection equipment. (See FM 5-101.)

a. Large numbers of antitank and antipersonnel mines laid by both parties remain in the area when the belligerent parties withdraw after a conflict. It is rare that either party makes their minefield records available to the peacekeeping force. Too often minefields are badly marked or not marked at all.

b. The minefields still belong to the party who laid them. In theory, they remain as part of their obstacle plan should the peacekeeping force with-

draw. The peacekeeping force does not release the positions of one party's minefields to the other, although it must ensure that minefields are well marked. The peacekeeping force is not normally permitted to clear the minefields. The exception is to destroy or remove mines and unexploded ammunition that is a hazard along roads and areas used by the force and local civilians.

c. All minefields must be recorded and fenced in by using standard minefield markers that are attached to a two-strand barbed wire fence. Members of a peacekeeping force should know the minefield marking methods used by the opposing parties.

d. Engineers record minefields in peacekeeping forces. They maintain the master minefield maps for the entire area and in each sector. They periodically inspect minefield maps, records, and the marking of minefields.

e. When a new minefield is discovered, a warning is immediately displayed in the area, and a report is made through the sector operations and the engineers to force headquarters. The force minefield recording officer activates a minefield recording team to reconnoiter and mark the area.

f. Current minefield maps are disseminated to force headquarters, sector headquarters, force reserve headquarters, MP, and civil police, if working with the peacekeeping forces. The minefield recording officer maintains current maps for the entire area. The sector minefield recording officers maintain current maps for their sectors.

g. Explosions in either the host nation's territory outside or inside the area are reported through sector headquarters to the operations staff at force headquarters. Explosive devices or mines discovered in the area outside marked minefields are reported to force headquarters for explosive demolition action. Meanwhile, they are marked and arrangements made to warn the force and local civilians.

4-22. INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS

The peacekeeping force investigates complaints or allegations. The peacekeeper's ability to make a thorough and objective investigation and a fair assessment may determine whether fighting resumes and tensions increase. It enhances the

impartial image of the peacekeeper to the antagonists. Usually, a decision that favors one side does not please the other. However, if the peacekeeper is fair, objective, and consistent, the antagonists may not agree, but they will respect and accept the peacekeeper's judgment. Since two or more sides are always involved, the peacekeeper must listen to all of them before deciding.

4-23. OBSERVER TECHNIQUES

The peacekeeper must cultivate a mental technique to ensure his vigilance and alertness do not diminish with time. He must maintain these qualities, both on and off duty, since his observation reports may determine if a crisis situation is avoided. These techniques can aid an observer in the accomplishment of his mission.

a. While on static duty, the peacekeeper—

(1) Keeps alert for the unusual, mainly for changes in the physical occupation of the area such as subjects/objects normally present but now missing or present where they were not before. He records anything that is different.

(2) When on duty in an OP, changes position so as to obtain a different angle of sight over his arc of observation.

(3) Divides his arc of observation into sub-arcs and alternates from one to another during the period of observer duty.

(4) Notes and responds to changes or differences in the behavioral patterns of people who work daily in the area.

(5) During his tour of duty, records the number of animals and people in the fields, and the number and type of vehicles that pass through or are parked in the arc of observation. In many cases of complaint and allegations of abduction, theft and interference information can be valuable.

(6) Draws a sketch of the area to include the whole arc. He records all that happens within the arc of observation during the tour of duty, including the smallest items. He uses the sketch as a diary of events.

(7) Instead of drawing a sketch, maintains a log of events and records everything.

(8) Avoids daydreaming or fretting over personal problems.

b. When traveling around the operational area, the peacekeeper—

- (1) Is constantly observant.
- (2) Records circumstances, incidents, or activities that seem unusual.
- (3) Asks questions when deemed necessary always in a diplomatic and friendly manner—not aggressively. However, caution must be exercised for self-protection by unarmed observers.
- (4) Varies the traveling route to sharpen interest and alertness, and to widen the area of observation.
- (5) Observes and records remarks or comments that apply to the situation. He is overt in behavior, and he does not act as a spy.
- (6) Records conversations immediately after they have occurred so the content can be easily recalled.
- (7) Reports observations at the end of the journey or upon return to base or headquarters. He provides a copy to the duty officer.

4-24. MANNING OF CHECKPOINTS

A checkpoint is a self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe and control movement into and out of a buffer zone. Permanent checkpoints are set up on the main access routes. They cannot be moved or closed without the authority of the force commander. Temporary checkpoints can be set up on minor routes, usually on the authority of the sector (battalion) commander, although authority may be reserved for the force commander. (Possible layouts for permanent and temporary checkpoints are shown in Figure 4-1.) Checkpoints should be well marked with the force's colors and insignia.

a. Tasks. Soldiers tasks include:

- (1) Controlling movement and entrance to a buffer zone, mainly during a crisis.
- (2) Preventing smuggling of arms, drugs, and contraband.
- (3) Controlling refugees.
- (4) Acting as an OP as part of the peacekeeping force's observation plan.
- (5) Stopping and searching vehicles IAW TOR.

b. **Conduct.** Soldiers manning checkpoints must observe local customs to avoid offending the local population. (Guidelines for how soldiers perform their duties are shown in Table 4-1, page 4-20.)

c. **Equipment.** The required equipment at checkpoints includes:

- Barrels filled with sand or concrete to slow approaching vehicles.
- Barrier pole.
- Radio and telephone.
- Supporting weapons. (Whether a machine gun should be supplemented by an antitank weapon depends on the nature of the threat to the force. The decision to deploy antitank weapons is normally reserved for the force commander.)
- First-aid kit.
- Force flag.
- Floodlight (flashlights as stand-by).
- Log pad.




Figure 4-1. Layout of permanent and temporary checkpoints.

SERIAL	DO	DO NOT	REMARKS
1.	Do smile when approaching a vehicle and talk to the driver.	Do not be disrespectful or give any hint of dislike.	Arabs are proud. They dislike being ordered about and will react to your attitude. If you are friendly, they will be.
2.	Do speak to the driver and let him speak to the passengers.	Do not speak to women regardless of their age.	Speaking to a woman when a man is present is an offense to the man.
3.	Do ask the driver politely to do what you want him to do.	Do not put your head or arm in through the side window or open the door without permission.	If, even accidentally, you touch a woman or girl, you may be considered offending.
4.	Do speak naturally and no louder than needed.	Do not shout or show impatience.	If you shout, the driver may misunderstand you and think that you are swearing at him. If so, you may commit a grave social offense.
5.	When searching a person, be courteous. Do use scanners when possible.	Do not frisk women or tell them to put their hands up. Do not point a weapon directly at a woman unless essential for security reasons.	A Moslem does not like being touched. However, he understands the need for searching and, if done properly, he will normally not object.
6.	Whatever happens at the checkpoint, stay calm, and do make a special effort to be polite, regardless of your feelings.	Do not become involved in a heated argument. Do not use force unless force is used against you and then use only the minimum required.	State that you are only following orders. Do not hesitate to call your checkpoint commander when the need arises.
7.	Always maintain a high standard of dress and military bearing.	Do not become careless or sloppy in appearance.	If you look smart and professional, people are more likely to accept your authority and be willing to cooperate.

Table 4-1. Example of guidelines for the conduct of peacekeeping soldiers at checkpoints in Arab countries.

Section IV. PLANNING

The US may participate in PKO alone or as part of a multinational force. Most PKOs are under the control of the UN. They often involve ambiguous situations that require the peacekeeping force to deal with tensions and violence without participating. Commanders must consider planning and execution factors.

4-25. POLITICAL FACTORS

Commanders must understand how political factors influence the tactical execution of PKOs.

For instance, ROE, freedom of movement, and area of operations are mandated by the political process. Often, political restrictions limit the

military commander in the conduct of his mission. The tactical commander must comply with instructions. He must also inform the chain of command of the tactical implications of a political decision. Political and military leaders must be aware of each other's perceptions and problems.

a. The peacekeeping mission operates with a mandate that describes the scope of operations for the mission. The sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries. Although these countries are supposed to be impartial, each may have its own idea of what the peacekeeping force should do. Also, the agreement should frame the mandate for the peacekeeping force so as not to allow for an advantage on either side. For these reasons, the agreement can be imprecise and subject to other interpretations by the belligerent parties and other contributing countries.

b. Another political factor involves the ROE. The ROE must be clearly stated in simple language. The two main rules are: minimum use of force and complete impartiality. The use of deadly force is justified only under extreme conditions (self-defense) or as a last resort when all lesser means have failed.

c. The commander should consider the fiscal responsibility. The UN depends on voluntary or member nation contributions to meet its fiscal needs. The US has provided supplies and transportation at no cost to the UN, but it may not do so in the future. The policy implication must be considered if the US does not support a UN PKO due to fiscal constraints.

d. The initial set of facts and assumptions may change. If they do, changes must be made that may lead to the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force.

4-26. GUIDELINES

To plan a PKO, a planner should consider several elements. These include political factors, force structure, command and control, reinforcement/rotation, maintenance and supply of equipment, emergency withdrawal plan, weapons policy and ROE, public affairs policy, morale and welfare support, the use of technology, and force protection.

a. The problems of joining a multinational force in a strange and hostile environment, and with restrictions on one's freedom of action can be

conquered. Commanders should study the history and lessons of previous PKOs. They should expect problems when starting a new operation. Force mandates, which lay down the principles governing the conduct of operations, can vary to meet the needs of each operation. Guidelines that apply to the conduct of a peacekeeping force in all situations are as follows:

(1) All members must know the mission of the peacekeeping force.

(2) All members must be briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people, and be kept current on changes.

(3) All members should become familiar with the local civilians and understand their problems. This helps achieve a reputation for sympathy and fairness.

(4) All members keep a high profile, which puts their lives at great risk. Commanders must balance the need to maintain a confident presence with the safety of their troops.

(5) An officer should be present to make fast and crucial decisions when a detachment may face a difficult situation. These decisions may affect the reputation of the force, the success of the mission, and the safety of the peacekeeping troops.

(6) All units must enforce the policy on ROE and the action to be taken with regard to infringements and violations of agreements. In operations where units have used different standards to enforce the rules, there has been constant friction between the parties to the dispute. Also, retaliation has occurred among the national contingents of the peacekeeping force.

b. In peacekeeping, small incidents have major political impact. Seemingly minor events can increase quickly into major crises, which calls for emergency meetings of the Security Council. Although there are advantages in dealing with problems at the lowest level, senior commanders and force headquarters must keep abreast of the smallest incident. They may need to intervene at an earlier stage than is common to other military operations.

c. Centralized control ensures the same reaction to incidents by all units and may prevent action by less experienced peacekeepers. However, a senior commander cannot predict how incidents

may develop nor their outcome. He must allow junior leaders to show their initiative within the framework of force policy directives and SOPs.

d. Subordinates must inform their commanders of situations as they develop. They can suggest possible courses of action early so the commander has time to evaluate and give direction. If a subordinate expects a crisis, a senior commander or force commander may go to the scene to lead. However, an incident can develop so quickly that the subordinate must decide on the most sensible course of action immediately rather than allow a situation to become uncontrolled. The subordinate must quickly report his actions and reasons to his commander.

4-27. TECHNOLOGY

Technology can greatly assist in the conduct of PKOs. The missions may involve extended distances or restrictions that can be reduced by technology. Some of the useful systems include:

- Intelligence systems.
- Effective countermine equipment.
- Effective night vision equipment.
- Communications systems.
- Surveillance systems.
- Lightweight body armor.
- 8-mm video and polaroid cameras.
- Accurate ground maps.

Early in the planning process, commanders must consider the use of such technology as sensors to provide better surveillance or to perform other key peacekeeping roles. For example, the Sinai Field Mission successfully incorporated a wide range of sensors that monitor key terrain.

4-28. ESTIMATE OF THE MISSION AREA

In planning a PKO, commanders modify the IPB process to include an analysis of the conflict and the parties to the dispute, the civilian population, the host nation, and the terrain and weather. DIA handbooks and country studies, both classified and unclassified, are useful for this purpose. (See FM 34-130.)

a. The analysis can assist the peacekeeping force to understand the nature of the conflict. The

military abilities of the parties to the conflict also must be known.

b. An awareness of the population and its culture, language, politics, religion, and what the peacekeepers might expect (support, indifference, hostility) is helpful.

c. Knowledge of the situation and the host nation's government, military, and facilities available to support the peacekeeping force is vital.

d. A terrain analysis in the peacekeeper's area of operations is also vital to include the location of roads, railroads, ports, and airfields, the nature of the terrain, and the environment.

e. Knowledge of climate conditions and an evaluation of short-term weather forecasts are important. In regions of extreme seasonal change, intelligence produced during one season may be useless in another. Therefore, weather and terrain intelligence must be available and reviewed by the peacekeeping force to ensure it is current.

4-29. FORCE STRUCTURE

A review of the force structure of all UN PKOs shows mostly infantry-type units, augmented by support personnel. The standard size unit deployed is a battalion, since the battalion is the smallest, fully staffed, self-contained unit. Light infantry forces, with minimal augmentation, are organized, equipped, trained, and suited for the conduct of PKOs. The mission, as explained in the mandate, determines the exact augmentation and composition of an inserted unit. However, units should plan to deploy with all mortars or antitank weapons when conducting an observer mission.

a. The strength of the force depends upon its mandate and the size and nature of the area it must control. Battalions should deploy with all organic weapons to include AT and mortars. At one end of the scale, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF) has only two battalions and an authorized strength of 1,450. They supervise a narrow buffer zone in open country on the Golan Heights between two states. These states wish to maintain a cease-fire, even though one of them does not wish to conclude a peace treaty. At the other end of the scale, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) requires seven battalions and an authorized strength of 7,000. The battalions try to control a

large area of operations in broken, mountainous country among many warring factions.

b. The main combat arm component is the infantry battalion. The battalion can hold positions, provide a constant presence and observation, man checkpoints, interpose units, and enforce patrolling. Armored reconnaissance units, whose mobility, communications, and patrolling abilities are useful when the situation is fluid, involves a large region. Air detachments can provide proof of infringements of cease-fire and arms limitation agreements. Their presence deters major infringements, which enhances security. This, in turn, encourages an atmosphere of confidence that all parties will abide by the agreement.

d. The US can provide various personnel and equipment in support of PKOs. US contributions are likely to be limited to the provision of materiel, financial support, and observers. Military units and personnel may be available for missions or for providing functional support to an international force.

e. A peacekeeping force must be task-organized to accomplish the mission. The force structure must be the result of assessing the mission environment. This assessment must consider the politics of the country. Where clashes in urban areas may give rise to a revolt, the peacekeeping force must have a structure to meet such a need. It may be given broad police powers. If border clashes are the prime threat for renewed violence between regular forces of disputing parties, the peacekeeping force must have the structure, strength, and designated area of control for deterrence. Thus, the structure may be of greater military strength than can be defended. The basic force structure and correct augmentation depend on the situation. Also, language requirements and the use of liaison parties must be considered when task-organizing forces. Other force structure considerations include—

(1) Ensuring the force is large enough to defend itself and to set up a visible presence.

(2) Making the force flexible enough to concentrate forces in response to a local threat.

(3) Ensuring no one national element within the force dominates the others.

4-30. FORCE PROTECTION

Security in a peacekeeping mission is just as important as in any other military operation.

a. Terrorism poses problems for the peacekeeper. Suppressive action involves a political judgment since the man labeled a terrorist by one side may be hailed as a freedom-fighter by the other. The peacekeeper's tools of overt observation and the combining of forces are vital.

b. Peacekeepers must be neutral. If one side suspects that the peacekeeping force is informing the other, the peacekeeping force may be accused of espionage. One or both parties to the dispute may become uncooperative and jeopardize the success of the operation.

c. To prevent charges of espionage, commanders must control photographing in the areas of operations. Neither side should photograph the other's positions—cameras must not be displayed near them.

d. Commanders must show the same concern for the security of arms and ammunition as in any operation. Groups are always alerted to poorly guarded weapons.

e. Commanders should protect positions, headquarters, and other accommodations. They should guard against spectacular attacks with mines, car bombs, and mortars. If possible, buildings that are easy to approach undetected should be avoided. The number of men billeted in any one building should not present a target to terrorists. The manifest neutrality and impartiality of a force ensure that it does not become a target of hostility, which in themselves affords protection. However, a force must always be prepared for an attack by extremist groups.

f. A peacekeeping force is subject to security risks through its own personnel.

(1) Peacekeeping forces have no means of checking local employees. Governments or illegal organizations may bribe or pressure their employees to obtain information on politically sensitive matters or on the opposite side's forces. Commanders must exercise great care when discussing peacekeeping force affairs and when handling documents in the presence of local nationals.

(2) Officers, secretaries, communications personnel, and other key personnel possess much sensitive information about the local political situation, host nation deployments, commercial contracts, and financial matters. These people are known to the host governments and to terrorists who may try to compromise them to obtain information.

(3) Commanders should ensure that personnel who visit the host nation on duty receive briefings on the risks. These personnel should be under the surveillance of a security element.

4-31. DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING FORCE

This paragraph discusses several methods to deploy a peacekeeping force.

a. Permanent Allocation to Sectors.

(1) Units learn about the community and terrain in their respective sectors. Constant collecting and processing of information are advantages.

(2) Useful relationships develop with the local authorities of the host government, the police, and the leadership of the contending parties.

(3) Peacekeepers become well acquainted with the local forces. They can recognize belligerent military personnel who try to pass through checkpoints dressed as police or civilians.

(4) Soldiers must take pride in maintaining and improving positions and quarters.

(5) The disadvantage is that national contingents will interpret force policy in their sectors. Different approaches in the past have led to charges of inconsistency against the peacekeeping force. Also, habitual contact may lead to prolonged hostility with the belligerents.

(6) In a newly established force, there is enough activity to interest personnel (establishing positions and OPs, separating hostile forces, and supervising a withdrawal and the handover of territory). Boredom can occur when the force is well established, the opposing sides are quiet, and troops are watching a buffer zone in a quiet area.

b. Rotation Within the Force.

(1) All national contingents obtain a working knowledge in more than one area. This will be useful when reinforcing a threatened sector. It

provides consistency in dealing with incidents and problems, and troops are kept on the alert.

(2) Should friction develop between a contingent and a party to the dispute, or should relations become too friendly, it may be best to switch a contingent to a different sector.

(3) One disadvantage is the lack of time. Forces cannot gain much knowledge of the area, of the local authorities, and of the contending parties and personalities. Much of this information may not be passed to the relieving units.

(4) A major upheaval can occur for units that are usually on short peacekeeping tours. Since there is no standard length of tour common to all peacekeeping forces, rotation might present problems.

(5) Less interest and care in maintaining and improving positions and quarters may occur.

(6) Rotation may also increase expenses. This is an important concern since funds for peacekeeping are hard to obtain.

c. Integration.

(1) When there is trouble, undue political and military pressure must be prevented from affecting any one national contingent. The burden for enforcing needed but unpopular action should evenly affect the force. This shows political solidarity and equal commitment, and it avoids victimizing any one contingent.

(2) To achieve this, a force mobile reserve is formed on a contingency basis. The reserve is often grouped around an armored reconnaissance squadron of two or three infantry platoons. Since it is best to represent all the national contingents contributing infantry to the force, the platoons may be a composite of sections from different contingents. The aviation, communications, and logistic support elements form in the same way from their contingents.

(3) So that a multinational and multilingual force can operate effectively, it must train together. While the mobile reserve commander and his subordinate officers must reconnoiter likely crisis points, they should train where it will not alarm the local population and the parties in dispute. The national elements of the mobile reserve normally live with their parent units.

Section V. TRAINING

This section contains information for training personnel for all phases of PKOs. It provides guidance on training needs, techniques, and sustainment to include personnel selection, unit preparation, predeployment, patrolling, and so on.

4-32. PERSONNEL SELECTION

When selecting personnel for peacekeeping, commanders should consider the stress of this unique task. It is not without hazards or pressure, which can erode the required vigilance and alertness of a soldier.

a. The selection process should use units and personnel who can cope with a conflict environment. This produces a different reaction than normally derived from military training. These include the capacity for infinite patience and restraints. Personnel must be able to combine an approachable, understanding, and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. A professional demeanor, which stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning, gains more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion, or sarcasm. Personnel must cope with unpopularity. Each side seeks to press their position and then reacts vocally when stopped. To be unpopular with both sides at the same time is probably the best display of impartiality.

b. Leadership selection should focus on personnel who are credible and decisive, and who display high objectivity and a deep sense of impartiality. They should ease frustrations and humiliations but must also inspire confidence and sustain high morale among their men. They must be alert and stay current on all incidents in their areas of operations. They must learn quickly the politics at play in the mission area; and habits, characteristics, and customs of the local people.

c. A peacekeeping force requires a combination of both permanent and temporary units. Permanent units comprise the commander's staff and a logistic support element. The temporary units, which are the bulk of the force, comprise some type of infantry TF. Since establishing peacekeeping-only units is not likely, commanders should select units to enter into PKOs based on the organization, composition, abilities, and commitments of existing units. The logistic support element is a combination of civilian contractor and

military personnel. The normal tour should be at least one year for the permanent units and 180 days for the temporary units. To maintain unit cohesion, the temporary units should be rotated as a unit and not as personnel replacements.

d. Peacekeeping requires personnel to change their attitudes and approaches to conform to different circumstances from those normally found on the battlefield. These adjustments must suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action.

4-33. PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

To accomplish peacekeeping, personnel and units must be trained in many skills and techniques before deployment. The urgent need to deploy peacekeeping forces to establish a cease-fire often reduces the time for preparations, but training must always be conducted prior to deployment. Good leadership is vital at each level—from the unit commander to the junior leader. This requires skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Training emphasizes individual military skills. A two-week refresher course should be conducted for personnel who have previously been involved in PKOs.

a. In preparing for a peacekeeping mission, the force requires specific, mission-oriented training before deployment. At the core of all training is the orientation of a unit to conduct operations in a multinational or as a unilateral peacekeeping force. The unit must understand its place in the force, its objectives, and the implications of its presence.

b. The entire unit leadership must understand the mission and provide clear guidance on what is to be accomplished. The unit should conduct training during the predeployment and in-country phases to ensure that each member understands the reasons for his presence. Unit leadership must develop and maintain the highest degree of unit discipline throughout the course of the mission.

c. Personnel training should try to impart patience, flexibility, discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, and inquisitiveness.

(1) *Patience*. Except in a crisis, nothing happens quickly. An overeagerness to force the pace in negotiations may prejudice mission success. This is not only true at the higher levels but also at the lower levels, where local problems are often resolved by company officers and senior NCOs.

(2) *Flexibility*. Personnel must review all the facets of a problem. They must use ingenuity to explore all feasible courses of action or solutions, which do not violate the mandate.

(3) *Discipline*. Smartness, alertness, a military bearing, good behavior on and off duty, and courtesy all help to promote the prestige of a force. If the force is held in high esteem by the parties to the dispute, they are likely to listen to its advice and to respect its authority in a crisis. Good discipline helps to ease a force's task.

(4) *Professionalism*. A strong sense of professionalism promotes efficiency in each activity. If a force's observations and actions are reputed for accuracy and competence, the parties are more likely to accept its protests about violations to avoid confrontations.

(5) *Impartiality*. In all its transactions and contacts, a force must guard its reputation for impartiality. Officers and enlisted personnel must be careful off duty, both in their actions as well as criticism of either side. Controversial, off-the-record remarks can reach an unintended audience to hinder the force's task. Such remarks may lead to the offender's removal or withdrawal if they reflect a prejudice believed to be widely held in a national contingent.

(6) *Tact*. The parties to a dispute are likely to be sensitive and offended by any imagined ridicule. Paramilitary forces are highly sensitive and unpredictable in their reactions, since they are not officially recognized. Tact is required in all dealings with all parties. However, this need not detract from an honesty of purpose and firmness when appropriate.

(7) *Inquisitiveness*. Commanders must question with caution all that occurs within their areas of responsibility. The normal routine of daily life should not become too familiar and comfortable.

A seemingly minor event may go unnoticed, which could be important if compared to information from other observers.

d. An important aspect of training for a peacekeeping mission is to understand the force is the target of foreign intelligence activities. A good counterintelligence program is desired—one that emphasizes OPSEC and COMSEC.

4-34. TACTICAL SKILLS ENHANCEMENT

Training must enhance the tactical skills of a peacekeeping unit. Basic military skills must be stressed in a field environment, including small-unit collective training. Discipline is a prime concern because of the stress caused by the environment, the dullness of the routine, and the possibility of an incident occurring. A training program should include the following military skills:

- Operation of checkpoints and observation points.
- Patrolling.
- Map reading.
- Identification of weapons and equipment.
- Culture, language, habits, religion, and characteristics of local people.
- Sniper training.
- Environment survival.
- First aid.
- Rules of engagement.
- Contingency drills.
- Civil disturbance techniques.
- Search and seizure techniques.
- Legal considerations.
- Air assault operations.
- Explosive ordnance recognition, detection, and clearing (land mines and booby traps).
- Field sanitation and hygiene.
- Communications.
- Civil-military operations.
- Nuclear, biological, chemical training.

- Night operations including night vision devices.
- MOUT training.
- Driver training.

(See FMs 7-8, 7-10, and 7-20 for more information.)

4-35. OBSERVATION AND REPORTING

The observation and reporting functions of the peacekeeping force are vital since these are the force's main functions.

a. Violations of the treaty may not be obvious. The importance of accurately reporting all that is observed must be emphasized. When gathered at force headquarters, all routine reports may form a pattern of activity within the zone or sector. To vary this activity may provide clues as to changes that may later prove to be treaty violations. Personnel should know the standard reporting formats to include situation reports, shooting reports, overflight reports, and aircraft sighting reports. They should learn to recognize armored vehicles and equipment. Training includes all available GTAs such as 35-mm slides, scale models, and flash cards.

b. Training personnel to operate an OP is essential. An OP is a small unit-sized installation. Small units must learn the typical layout of an OP and checkpoint, and the daily routine of duty on an OP. A unit may be required to live and work on the OP for many days at a time, isolated from the larger parent organization. It may be of mixed nationalities, which adds to the complexity of the situation.

(1) Security procedures at an OP include a stand-to at BMNT (just before sunrise) and EENT (just after sunset). Perimeter sweep patrols should be dispatched immediately after stand-to.

(2) Personnel who man checkpoints astride major roads must be taught to slow and observe traffic without stopping it. This allows time to observe and report traffic passing from one zone to another.

(3) Vehicles and personnel leaving and entering installations should be stopped and searched for contraband and explosives. Personnel must learn not only how to search but also how to search courteously without undue force.

4-36. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

Communications are an essential part of knowing what is happening to influence events. The problem of providing adequate communications for the force before deployment is hard to solve, since so much depends on the events of the operation. In one theater, the problem may be the great distances involved. In another situation or in a different part of the same one, the problem is screening in urban areas. Sometimes, military communications may not be adequate. Procedures are often changed, because they are designed for a completely different mission.

4-37. LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

All leaders should be instructed in the basic words and phrases of the languages of the host country assigned to the peacekeeping force. Commanders coordinate direct support language augmentation with the next highest headquarters that has an organic MI element. Support normally consists of interrogators skilled in the target language and area customs and history. PKO force commanders use interrogators for translating, interpreting, negotiating, and training. Force training activities include training the force in basic language and customs in the area of operation.

4-38. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE TRAINING

Training from the local EOD detachment or engineer unit before deployment can inform personnel of the different types of land mines and IEDs. This includes Soviet, French, British, German, Italian, and US mines. The main emphasis of this training is to enable personnel to recognize, mark, and report mines and to realize that land mines, no matter how old they appear, are NOT inert. Another important matter in this training is to inform personnel on how to safely leave a minefield.

4-39. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL TRAINING METHODS

NBC training methods of identifying and handling the effects of the use of NBC weapons is important in all PKOs. The peacekeeper must recognize the different types of chemical agents that can be used. He must act accordingly to ensure not only his

own safety but also the safety of civilians and the parties to the dispute.

4-40. MISSION SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

When a peacekeeping force is deployed in an emergency to interpose between combatants, following the conclusion of an armistice, there will be little warning. The units designated will have little time for training.

a. Once a force is established, the units comprising the force can be rotated regularly. Units chosen in advance are given time to learn the techniques unique to peacekeeping.

b. Once in the area of operations, the force may have time for only orientations and reinforcement training from the unit being relieved. Training should be organized, planned, and conducted before deployment, depending on the time and available resources. Training in the area of responsibility may be limited by the agreement between the parties in the dispute.

c. The commander must constantly emphasize the neutrality of the force. Forces and personnel of both sides in the dispute must avoid casual contact. This could result in one side accusing the force of favoritism. Once the force has lost its position of neutrality, its usefulness is degraded. However, contact between contingents of the force is useful in terms of cohesion and interoperability. This can be achieved through small-unit exchanges, intercontingent competitions, conferences, and social events.

d. Leaders at junior officer and NCO levels must be motivated. Only in extreme circumstances are leaders bypassed by senior leaders in the exercise of responsibility or of command. The highest standards of leadership must apply not only during operations but also during training. To assist in developing leadership qualities of section and subsection commanders, commanders' duties should be emphasized from the beginning of training. Also, their sections should train as a team throughout.

e. The unit commander must also conduct training that allows the unit to conduct its primary mission when not involved in a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, the unit must incorporate basic military skill training and small-unit tactical training into their daily routine. Because of political

concerns, this training must be flexible and imaginative so as not to cause concern among the parties to the dispute.

4-41. MORALE, DISCIPLINE, AND ADMINISTRATION

The small-unit leader is responsible for the peacekeeping mission 24 hours a day, along with the health, morale, and training of his unit. During PKOs, he is responsible for all personnel who are under conditions that could become monotonous. The success of the mission, then, rests on the leadership and initiative of the small-unit leader to conduct operations along with maintaining the morale of his unit.

a. Although environmental and survival training is hard to conduct when not in the actual environment, this training must take place. It should introduce basic subjects that can be further trained after the force has deployed into its operational area.

b. Transportation of personnel and supplies is a challenge for a unit occupying a large sector. Air transportation by helicopter includes techniques in air assault (load planning, pathfinder techniques, and sling loading). Units often deploy by air into and out of OPs and must know how to stow equipment aboard the helicopter. Training in initial ground control procedures for incoming helicopters is also vital. Vehicle and aircraft maintenance must be emphasized. If transportation becomes inoperable due to poor maintenance, mission accomplishment can be jeopardized.

c. Personal hygiene, medical care, self-aid, and sanitation are of extreme importance. OPs and checkpoints can be far removed from medical facilities, and widespread illness could cause the force to fail in its mission. Human waste must be disposed of each day, and personnel must keep themselves clean to avoid disease, mainly gastrointestinal disease.

d. An SOP for the PKO is required. It must include reporting formats and procedures, ROE, OP and checkpoint routines, and resupply procedures. An SOP can also include vehicle and personnel search procedures, medical concerns, evacuation requests, lists of persons allowed to enter peacekeeping installations, and contact restrictions with local forces and personnel. This

SOP should be based on area handbooks produced by the parent command.

e. A peacekeeping mission is meant to be visible to all concerned. Due to this fact, locals and other contingents scrutinize the force. The force must, therefore, reflect vigilance, readiness, and competence in its duties. Personnel in isolated OPs and checkpoints can become bored with the daily routine. However, innovative leadership can take steps to enhance interest. Rotation of units between OPs and checkpoints, as well as out of sector, can help avoid boredom.

f. The nature of the mission demands a high standard of discipline and, mainly, self-discipline. Self-discipline is a state of mind that is vital to the efficient performance of duty. All commanders must be aware of the importance of good discipline during training. Special attention must be paid to the following:

- (1) Proper briefing so that all personnel know what is happening.
- (2) Issue of clear, concise, and simple orders.

- (3) A high standard of cleanliness, care, and maintenance of all weapons, equipment, and uniforms.

- (4) Motivation of all personnel to maintain a high standard of discipline.

- (5) Regular inspection and supervision by leaders.

4-42. POST-PEACEKEEPING MISSION TRAINING

Peacekeeping requires a complete change in orientation for military personnel. Before the peacekeeping mission, training was provided to prepare the combat-ready soldier to one that is constrained in all his actions. After a peacekeeping mission, unit commanders must plan refresher training to return units to a combat-ready status. Such training strengthens skills that have been weakened by the nature of a PKO. Therefore, a training program must hone those skills needed to meet the standards of a combat-ready unit.

